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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CoNsTITuTIoNAL LAw-DuE PROCESS OF LAW uNDER FOURTEENTH AMiEND-
MENT-RES JUDICATA-CLASS SuiTs-[United States].-Landowners in a
Chicago residential district signed a restrictive agreement designed to pre-
vent renting or selling to negroes. Signatures of ninety-five per cent of the
owners of the neighborhood were required to make the agreement effective.
In an action to enforce the agreement against a breaching signer, it was
stipulated between the parties that the required quota of signatures had
been obtained.1 Subsequently, the instant action was brought to enjoin the
purchase by defendant, a negro, of land of a signing owner. Defendant
contended that the agreement was inoperative because the required quota
of signatures had not been obtained. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the plaintiffs in the previous suit had represented all other
signers, including defendant's grantor, and that defendant, since he claimed
under a party represented in the prior proceeding, was bound by the finding
that the necessary number of owners had signed. 2 On certiorari the Supreme
Court of the United States held that there was no such community of inter-
est between the plaintiffs in the previous action and present defendant's
grantor as to establish a representative relation between them within the
doctrine of class suits; and, therefore, to hold present defendant bound by
issues concluded in the previous action was to deny him due process of
law. Hansberry v. Lee.3
It has been held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires a state court to give all parties a hearing, or an opportunity
to be heard, before passing judgment.4 This constitutional requirement is
qualified, however, by the doctrine of res judicat when a cause of action
or a controverted issue has been fairly litigated in a prior action between
the parties.5 This doctrine has been extended to actions by a party in
privity with litigants in a prior action involving identical issues, provided
only that the initial litigants were afforded due opportunity for hearing.0
1. Burke v. Klieman (1934) 277 Ill. App. 519.
2. Lee v. Hansberry (1939) 372 Ill. 369.
3. (1940) 61 S. Ct. 115.
4. In the case of Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago (1897) 166 U. S.
226, 235, citing Davidson v. New Orleans (1877) 96 U. S. 97, 102, the
Court said: "In determining what is due process of law regard must be
had to substance, not to form. This court referring to the Fourteenth
Amendment, has said: 'Can a state make anything due process of law
which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm this
is to hold that the prohibition to the states is of no avail, or has no appli-
cation, where the invasion of private rights is effected under forms of
state legislation.'" See: Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714; Scott v.
McNeal (1894) 154 U. S. 34; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works (1915) 237
U. S. 413; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport (1918) 247 U. S. 464.
5. Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States (1897) 168 U. S. 1; Postal
Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport (1918) 247 U. S. 464. See 1 Greenleaf,
Evidence (16th ed. 1899) 656, sec. 522.
6. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport (1918) 247 U. S. 464; Old
Wayne Mut. Life Assoc. v. McDonough (1907) 204 U. S. 8; Comment (1941)
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Also, when a party to a present action has actively participated in a previ-
ous action upon the same issues, though not nominally a litigant, he has
been duly represented and cannot resist the enforcement of the decree or
bring another action.7
Another recognized extension of the doctrine of res judicata is the class
suit. When members of a class have a common interest and are too numer-
ous to be effectually joined, a judgment in an action by or against a
member of the class, acting in a representative capacity, is binding upon
all members as to issues common to them all.8 Thus, when shareholders
of a corporation are made severally liable by statute for the corporate debts,
a judgment against the corporation will be conclusive as to the existence
and amount of the debt; and a judgment against individual shareholders,
acting in that capacity, will be conclusive as to the liability of all.9 The
mere fact of acquiring shares is an assumption of such liability.10 So, too,
incorporated fraternal and insurance societies stand as representatives of
their members.," Determinations of right and fact in class suits are con-
clusive in subsequent actions by or against members of the class.12
The doctrine of the class suit is not always applicable when there is
an ostensible common interest. An initial common interest may sometimes
ultimately become adverse.13 In an action involving a class, the interest
of the members must be "identical and in no way conflicting,"'14 and the
action must affect all in the same respect.15 When the rights at issue are
those of certain persons as individuals rather than as members of a class,
the action is not representative, and a judgment will not conclude the rights
of other members of the class.16 Similarly, a judgment concluding the
7. Plumb v. Goodnow's Adm'r (1887) 123 U. S. 560.
8. Smith v. Swormstedt (U. S. 1853) 16 How. 288; Bacon v. Robertson
(U. S. 1855) 18 How. 480; Wallace v. Adams (1907) 204 U. S. 415.
9. Bernheimer v. Converse (1907) 206 U. S. 516; Converse v. Hamilton
(1912) 224 U. S. 243; Selig v. Hamilton (1914) 234 U. S. 652; Marin v.
Augedahl (1918) 247 U. S. 142; Chandler v. Peketz (1936) 297 U. S. 609.
Cf. The New England Divisions Case (1923) 261 U. S. 184, which holds
that the Interstate Commerce Commission may set a general rate schedule
by using "typical evidence," and that the various affected carriers in the
class to which that evidence is applicable are precluded from separate ad-
judication of their claims.
10. Royal Arcanum v. Green (1915) 237 U. S. 531. See Converse v.
Hamilton (1912) 224 U. S. 243; Chandler v. Peketz (1936) 297 U. S. 609.
11. Royal Arcanum v. Green (1915) 237 U. S. 531; Hartford Life Ins.
Co. v. Ibs (1915) 237 U. S. 662; Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble
(1921) 255 U. S. 356.
12. Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States (1897) 168 U. S. 1; Hartford
Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs (1915) 237 U. S. 662. The Supreme Court of the
United States has taken cognizance of, and allows, class suits. 28 U. S.
C. A. (1928) Equity Rule 38.
13. Terry v. Bank of Cape Fear (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1884) 20 Fed. 777;
Weidenfield v. Northern Pac. Ry. (C. C. A. 8, 1904) 129 Fed. 305.
14. Terry v. Bank of Cape Fear (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1884) 20 Fed.
777, 781.
15. Ribon v. Railroad Cos. (U. S. 1872) 16 Wall. 446; Weidenfield v.
Northern Pac. Ry. (C. C. A. 8, 1904) 129 Fed. 305.
16. McQuillen v. National Cash Reg. Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1938) 22 F.
Supp. 867, aff'd (C. C. A. 4, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 877.
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rights of members of a class will not conclude an individual as to issues
personal to him.' 7 Mere allegation that the suit is brought in behalf of
all will not withstand the defense of non-joinder.' 8 In all these imperfect,
"quasi-class" actions, a failure to join all parties is a failure of due process
as to those not joined if it is sought to assert against them the decree or
the findings of fact and law supporting it.10
Analytically, it would seem that the representative status of plaintiff
in the previous action on the agreement involved in the instant case was
at best dubious, owing to the uncertain character of the class he purported
to represent. If he represented all the signing landowners, he was in the
anomalous position of representing the very defendant whom he sued. If
he represented only those signers interested in enforcing the agreement,
it cannot with certainty be said that the class included the instant de-
fendant's grantor, who now asserts a contrary interest. Moreover, the con-
stituency of such a class at any given moment would be well-nigh indeter-
minable, and would be subject to change without notice, at the whim of
the individual owners.20 Such shifting sands are hardly a suitable founda-
tion for a holding that defendant was precluded by representation from an
effective litigation of the contested issue. This is the more true because
the issue was previously disposed of by stipulation between the parties.
Since it cannot with certainty be said that defendant's grantor was legally
represented in the previous action, defendant is entitled under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to a fair hearing on the issues
necessary to sustain his position. R. T. S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-POWER OF PRESIDENT TO REMOVE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICERS-EFFECT OF STATUTORY LIDITATIONS--[Federal].-The act which
established the Tennessee Valley Authority' provides that the President
may remove directors if they appoint employees on a political basis. The
President removed the petitioner solely because he felt it was in the best
interest of the administration of the Authority. Petitioner sued for back
salary, alleging that the methods and grounds specified by the act are ex-
clusive. Held: The President has inherent power to remove an executive
officer appointed by him, even though the officer was appointed for a fixed
17. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works (1915) 237 U. S. 413.
18. Wabash R. R. v. Adelbert College (1908) 208 U. S. 38.
19. See cases cited supra notes 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.
20. In Lee v. Hansberry (1939) 372 Ill. 369, 379-380, Shaw, J., said:
"There could be no certainty nor even any probability that they all would
agree on a course of conduct to be followed at any particular time or under
any particular circumstances. There was no common right nor any common
fund, nor any common or undivided res to be dealt with, and certainly no
one ever had any right or power to speak for any one but himself."
The conclusion of the foregoing quotation is founded upon the considera-
tion that each property owner owned his land in severalty, his obligation
under the agreement was several, and he might or might not wish to enforce
or contest the validity of the agreement.
1. Tennessee Valley Authority Act (1933) 48 Stat. 58, c. 32, 16 U. S.
C. A. (Supp. 1940) secs. 831-831dd.
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